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  Good afternoon.  This has been a remarkable day, as well as a fitting and deserved tribute 
to Dick Bilder.  It has been a pleasure to participate.  Dave Trubek began our discussions by 
identifying three themes in Dick’s work to guide our thinking about the relationship between 
international law and foreign policy: pragmatic legalism, institutionalism and professionalism.  I 
would like to place these themes in the context of three conceptions of the relationship between 
law and power that have been significant in our discussions this weekend.   
 
  In 1962, Dick wrote a modest piece for the American Journal of International Law about 
the workings of the Legal Advisor’s Office in the State Department.  Since then, he has written 
dozens of other pieces – why do we keep returning to this early work?  Dick’s 1962 article has 
stood the test of time because it evokes a sensibility about the relationship between law and 
power, an approach to law and government, which we recognize now as the spirit of an age, of a 
generation, of a profession, of a ruling elite  – and of a country.  We recognize in Dick’s 
description of the legal advisor’s work the spirit of American lawyering that international 
lawyers in the United States have sought for a generation to universalize.   
 
  Here is Dick’s evocation of the problem solving ethos of the American government 
attorney in mid-century: 
 
The task of finding ways to work out international disputes tends also to develop in the 
Office attorney what might be called a pragmatic or functional approach to international 
law — a tendency to view that law less as a body of fixed and unchangeable rules than as 
a flexible tool for use in forging real solutions to practical problems of international 
order.  Perhaps as an outgrowth of common-law training, there is a working habit of 
viewing new and unique areas of problems on a case-by-case basis at first, and letting the 
law work itself out, rather than jumping immediately into the enunciation of broad 
principles.  In general, precedent and authority, while important, do not preclude analysis 
in terms of sensible result and workable rule.
1   
 
Dick left government to write this sensibility down, and to teach it here at Wisconsin to 
generations of students.  Bill Rogers lived it across an extraordinary career as lawyer and 
diplomat.  Tom Franck theorized it, extolled its virtus, and participated in its development as the 
external voice of rule and reason – and faith in their potential.    
 
  A first idea about the relationship between law and power is reflected in the title of our 
                                                 
 
1Richard Bilder, The Office of the Legal Advisor: the State Department Lawyer and 
Foreign Affairs 56 Am. J. INT’L L. , 633, 680 (1962). deliberations: “speaking law to power.”  In this vision, law and power are different – they 
promote different values, evaluate the national interest differently, and express different 
commitments.   Law is associated with multilateralism, diplomacy and universal humanism – 
power with unilateralism, force and the national interest.  Law expresses long run, rather than 
short term interests, attends more faithfully to reciprocity and the viewpoint of the “other,” while 
power attends to short run advantages and strategizes our unilateral potential.   In this vision, the 
world of international affairs is predominantly a world of power and politics – law is marginal, it 
speaks but does not do.  This idea was stressed at various moments in our debates by Philip 
Allott, by Joachim Frowein, and Tom Franck.  In this vision, law is more a restraint than a 
pathway, although it also suggests a foreign policy engaged with multilateral institutions and 
wary of unilateral actions.   
 
  Dick Bilder’s gloss on law’s special point of view is what David Trubek termed his 
“pragmatic legalism.”  It is a somewhat more hard-boiled vision — less sentimental about the 
virtues of multilateralism, and less idealist about universal humanist commitments.   In Dick’s 
vision, international law contributes a distinct perspective, perhaps less outside power than 
alongside it.   Dick’s description of the specific vocation of the Legal Advisor’s Office is 
catalogs what he saw as law’s unique contributions to policy deliberation: hesitant to write new 
law unless necessary, skeptical of the efficacy of agreement absent “shared or reciprocal 
interests,” attentive to the strategic uses of bilateral and multilateral instruments, “serious 
dedication to compliance with existing law” while attentive to the needs of a more flexible 
diplomacy, and more attuned to “sensible result and workable rule” than to “precedent and 
authority.” 
 
  While the Office seeks to accomplish maximum United States objectives in      
all negotiations, there is also a realization that any attempt to “win” a negotiation – to try 
to “put something over” on the other party — may be self-defeating, since experience 
suggests that an unbalanced or one sided agreement will in the long run tend to cause 
more disputes than it resolves.  An agreement which is fair and confers benefits on both 
sides is thus a most profitable one for all parties.
2
 
  Over the course of the last days, we have also heard some of the difficulties this vision 
has encountered.  Pragmatic legalism turns out not to be everyone’s idea of the best way to 
proceed.   The sensibility Dick describes is rooted in culture – in the particular culture of a 
regime, in the culture of the State Department at a particular time.  A great deal depends on the 
way the Legal Office is itself structured –different national regimes involve the lawyers at 
different stages for different purposes.  As a result, the special viewpoint of “international law” 
varies with institutional,  cultural and political context.   Looking back, it appears that 
appreciation for “balanced” agreements — which Dick associates with the special perspective of 
international law — has varied across American administrations.  Professors Frowein and Allott 
gave us a good sense for the rather different lawyer’s viewpoint in the British and German 
traditions of foreign policy making, resulting, as much from a different organization of the legal 
office as from broader historical and cultural ideas about the distinctiveness of law.   
 
                                                 
 
2Id. at 650   At the same time, the relationship between power and legal restraint is not as 
straightforward as the phrase “speak law to power” might suggest.  Nathaniel Berman drew our 
attention to the significance of defiance and violation – of opposing the law – as a source of 
power, and suggested an image of law as part of the currency through which power is exercised.   
Pragmatic legalism can also make it difficult to see the dark sides of international law.   I 
routinely take a vote in my international law class at the start of the year – do you think 
international law is a good thing and there should be more of it, or do you think international 
law, on balance, is a bad thing and there should be less of it?   As one might expect, the 
overwhelming majority of international law students find it a good thing.   But then I ask them 
what costs they were weighing against international law’s undoubted virtues.  Rarely have the 
enthusiasts weighed any costs.   Promoting international human rights is the same as promoting 
human justice, international law offers tools to protect the environment, but nothing to the 
determined environmental despoiler, nothing to the terrorist.   Multilateralism may offer long 
term advantages and a world of law may be better than the world we now have – but what are the 
short term costs, and what eggs will need to be broken, what interests sacrificed, to get to the 
world of law?   The image of law outside, speaking to power, expressing an alternative vision, 
makes law seem innocent of these costs.   
 
  A second image of the relationship between law and power that ran through our 
deliberations evoked an international governance regime riddled with law – rather than a world 
of power, spoken to by the marginal, if distinctive, voice of law.  Law in the interstices of power, 
law as an instrument of government, as a compliance program and management tool.  Law as a 
management system and a vocabulary for policy making.   The word “policy” is crucial to this 
vision –a blending of law and power.  Myres McDougal formulated this vision most explicitly at 
mid-century.  Law as a vocabulary for world public order – at once a scheme of values, an 
institutional structure and a disciplinary sensibility for policy making and management.   Bill 
Rogers expressed it most eloquently here when he stressed the permissive nature of international 
law, and the lawyer’s role as a creator of law.   
 
  Dave Trubek called Dick’s version of this vision “institutionalism.”  Another term might 
be “liberal constitutionalism,” in the sense that we think of the United Nations Charter as 
inaugurating a constitutional framework for legitimating and delegitimating uses of force, or in 
which John Jackson proposes we view the World Trade Organization as a “constitutional” 
regime for managing differences among national regulatory regimes impinging in different ways 
on international commerce.  In this conception, the power of law is more diffused, and the global 
vernaculars of experts – lawyers, economists, technical specialists – are more significant than the 
ideological commitments or visions of national interest propounded by politicians.  Policy 
making is less a struggle between a good law and a bad politics than a process through which 
specialists collaborate in devising solutions to problems.  
 
  This vision also raised innumerable difficult questions.  Does “law as policy” favor the 
strong?  Are third world states disempowerd by a global regime which happens at once 
everywhere and nowhere, in the technical vernaculars of experts rather than the familiar 
vocabularies of interest and ideology?   If we return again to midcentury, it was often 
international lawyers from the third world – following Wolfgang Friedmann and Mohammed 
Bedjaoui – who were most insistent on the need for antiformal, flexible, more “social” and “cooperative” approach to international law.  But one also hears complaints the other way – only 
the rich can afford to staff and press their interests through a medium so plastic.   This vision is 
also anything but universal.  “Constitutionalism” has rather different evocations in the United 
States, Britain, Germany, and the European Union – let alone Mexico, China or India.  
Globalization does seem to be promoting a kind of homogenization of expert vocabularies 
around the planet, the relationship between these policy managers and the rest of the economic 
and political system is quite different in different places.   Nevertheless, the policy management 
sensibility evoked by Dick Bilder at the state department in 1962 has become more far more 
widespread in the ensuing years, creating a kind of “as if” world government of experts and 
expertise.   Protestors across the globe reacted to the Iraq War in the vocabulary of international 
law: “it’s illegal.”   
 
  Of course here also there are difficulties. Expert vocabularies, for all their open flexibility 
and pragmatic attention to consequences and problem solving, also suffer from professional 
deformations, blind spots and biases.  To a carpenter with a hammer, everything can look like a 
nail.  What are the politics of this expertise?  How can we translate the terms used by policy 
managers into the vernaculars of left-center-right, or of social interests, that we might contest the 
decisions experts take in political terms – or through political, even democratic, pathways?  What 
are the ethics of this management expertise — how has it become universal?  What alternative 
languages have been lost in the process?   The pressing challenge in 1962 was to build a global 
machinery for problem solving – decentralized, professional, pragmatic.  The most pressing 
challenge for the next generation might well be to open this process to political contestation — 
less to tame an unruly politics into the calmer paths of constitutional management than to open a 
technocratic world to political challenge and heterodoxy.   
 
  Taken together, these two visions – law outside, speaking to power — law inside, 
managing as power — pose a problem of responsibility.    The best international lawyers are 
ambivalent, oscillating, eclectic in their engagement with these two sets of ideas.   Sometimes 
shifting from one to the other can be a way of avoiding responsibility for the outcomes of global 
policy making while seeming able to participate fully in it.  I worry that international lawyers so 
often seem to have a desire to be marginal — to be a silent power, or to be vocal and powerless.  
 
  A third idea about the relationship between law and power which ran through our work 
the last two days would see law as a vocabulary for power.  People expressed this idea in various 
ways.  Philip Allott spoke of law “constituting society.”  Martti Koskenneimi spoke of a legal 
“spirit” beyond instrumentalism.   Various of us expressed the notion that politicians are 
speaking the vocabulary of law, even when they make war – as they decide what is a 
proportional, necessary or legitimate application of military force.   In this vision the legal and 
political vocabularies have merged – military effectiveness or market efficiency becoming both a 
legal standard and a policy objective.   
 
  In a way, this vision simply articulates the triumph of the liberal constitutional idea – the 
end result when humanitarian lawyers have fully infiltrated the minds and world views of those 
they would bend to humanitarian ends.   In this vision, we should see George Bush as a human 
rights activist when he orders bombs dropped for humanitarian objectives – just as we should see 
international law as an environmental despoiler or terrorist when international legal rules – of sovereignty, of jurisdiction – give cover to actors, whether states or private parties, who 
participate in terrorism or ecological harm.   We often had occasion this weekend to refer to the 
remarkable biographical film about Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in many ways the 
exemplar of mid-century policy thinking.  He reminded us repeatedly in that film that the 
problem was not generals who got away with murder, but the best and the brightest who planned, 
carried out and justified murder in the best vocabularies of law and policy.   
 
  Dick Bilder also contributed to our understanding of this third set of ideas, in what Dave 
Trubek termed his “international law professionalism.”  For Dick, this meant an ethic of self-
consciousness, a sensibility about the responsible exercise of power in the vocabularies of law 
and policy.  Oscar Schachter’s term the “invisible college” might be another useful slogan for 
owning international law’s own will to power and experience of rulership, or for encouraging its 
responsible exercise.   Philip Allott proposed a parallel sensibility – the lawyer who must decide 
between clarity and constructive obscurity, or between honesty and discretion, in the exercise of 
his or her authority.   In these acts of discretion, the expert – lawyer, policy maker – knows him 
or herself to be a ruler, to be acting, deciding, in ways which will have consequences for others, 
and which are not determined by the terms of legal expertise or policy pragmatism.  This is the 
domain — within the professions — of human freedom and responsibility.    
 
  In this vision, there is nothing wrong with lawyers or policy makers, whether national or 
international, seeking to rule the world.  The question is whether they do so responsibly – or 
whether they do so in denial.  Take the problem of war, which has been so present for us this 
weekend.  The problem here is not whether international law legitimated or delegitimated war.  
The question is how those who decided to kill experienced their action — and how international 
law affected that experience.  All too often, international law offers those who must decide to kill 
a comforting illusion.  It might be the illusion that international law entitled them, even 
compelled them to do it – they were less killing than exercising and defending their rights.  It 
might be the illusion that international law kept them on the margins of killing – they were safely 
to one side, speaking truth to power.  But more often, in the flexible pragmatic world of policy, 
international law offers one the illusion that the decision to kill was actually a judgment – a 
judgment about the precise meaning of a vexingly vague standard, like proportionality, on an 
uncertain and shifting field of action.  The professional must be practical, forward looking, 
flexible.  The question whether killing this woman or child or man will be “collateral” and 
“necessary” and “proportional” is, we say, a judgment call.   There is no legal rule, no metric.  
But there is escape from the experience of decision to the idea that those evaluating targets are 
exercising judgment.   
 
  I take another vote in my international law class each year.  When we discuss the history 
of international law, I speak about the international lawyers of 1648 and 1918 – convinced by the 
trauma of war that the entire international system needed to be rebuilt root and branch.   I speak 
about the generation of 1945, living in a house half built, half burned – who felt they must 
modify, extend and complete the vision of multilateral institutions and codified norms which had 
formed the basis for international law since the early 1920s.  What, I ask, is our situation today?  
For you, largely born after 1980, living after the end of the cold war, after terrorism and 9.11, 
after globalization?   How many think your generation lives in a world whose international law 
and institutions are up to the challenges we face, and need only to be used responsibly?  How many think the situation is like 1945 – the house is half built, half burned – the international 
system needing remodeling, updating, completion, to deal with new challenges?  And how many 
think your generation faces a situation like that of 1918 or 1648, for whom all the ideas and 
institutions of the last century seemed part of the problem rather than the solution, and for whom 
everything would need to be rethought, remade, re-imagined?   
 
  For years, the overwhelming majority chose the middle position – the vocabulary is there, 
the institutions are there, we must work to extend them, update them, apply them and encourage 
their use.  In the last three years something has changed – two thirds now feel all we have been 
discussing here must be thrown out, and we must begin again.    It may be the romance, the 
optimism, the energy and anger of youth, but I admire the boldness of their vision.  So long as 
we respond to the global challenges of poverty and war in the language of international law, I 
worry that we will blunt the energy needed to reconstitute our global political, moral and 
economic order.  I would like to propose a different task for international law – less a program of 
action than the conveyor of a new sensibility about law and power.   A sensibility of human 
freedom and responsibility, of clarity about what we do not know, and about the power in our 
hands, rather than clarity about what we know and denial of our power.   Of moral action in an 
ethically irrational world.  A training ground for what Weber once terms “politics as a vocation.”   
 
  Thank you for two days of fascinating conversation.   
 
  
 